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The United Kingdom implemented a containment 
strategy for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 through administering 
antiviral agents (AVs) to patients and their close contacts. 
This observational household cohort study describes the 
effect of AVs on household transmission. We followed 
285 conﬁ  rmed primary cases in 259 households with 761 
contacts. At 2 weeks, the conﬁ   rmed secondary attack 
rate (SAR) was 8.1% (62/761) and signiﬁ  cantly higher in 
persons <16 years of age than in those >50 years of age 
(18.9% vs. 1.2%, p<0.001). Early (<48 hours) treatment 
of primary case-patients reduced SAR (4.5% vs. 10.6%, 
p = 0.003). The SAR in child contacts was 33.3% (10/30) 
when the primary contact was a woman and 2.9% (1/34) 
when the primary contact was a man (p = 0.010). Of 53 
conﬁ   rmed secondary case-patients, 45 had not received 
AV prophylaxis. The effectiveness of AV prophylaxis in 
preventing infection was 92%. 
F
ollowing emergence of pandemic inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) 
2009 in North America in spring 2009 (1,2), global 
spread of the virus was rapid (3,4). In the United Kingdom, 
the ﬁ  rst conﬁ  rmed cases were detected in travelers returning 
from Mexico (5). The United Kingdom implemented a 
containment strategy until July 2009 that involved rapid 
case ascertainment, early treatment with antiviral drugs 
(AVs), and postexposure prophylaxis of patients’ close 
contacts.
One key uncertainty was the transmissibility of the 
virus in household settings. Household-based studies 
of avian inﬂ   uenza previously provided a measure of 
transmissibility of newly emerging inﬂ  uenza viruses and 
also of the effectiveness of AVs in reducing spread (6). 
Early reports on pandemic (H1N1) 2009 have provided 
information on household transmission (7–11). Although 
most are from settings where AVs were not used (8,10) or 
where only a limited number of households were recruited 
(7,9), early work suggests that AVs had some effect on 
spread (11,12).
A detailed investigation of the ﬁ  rst few 100 (FF100) 
case-patients and their close contacts (13) was undertaken 
across the United Kingdom beginning in April 2009 to gain 
an early understanding of the clinical and epidemiologic 
parameters of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (14). Following the 
publication of early FF100 ﬁ  ndings (5,11,15), we report the 
ﬁ  nal results from ≈300 UK households of key household 
transmission characteristics.
Methods
The FF100 study has been described in detail (15,16). 
This study was a prospective investigation of the ﬁ  rst 
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laboratory-conﬁ   rmed cases and patients’ household 
contacts to determine key parameters such as virologic and 
clinical secondary attack rates (SARs) and effectiveness of 
AVs. 
Deﬁ  nitions
Three case deﬁ   nitions were used: 1) virologically 
conﬁ  rmed cases were persons testing positive for pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus by speciﬁ  c reverse transcription PCR 
(RT-PCR) on respiratory swab; 2) inﬂ  uenza-like illness 
(ILI) cases were persons experiencing history of fever and 
>1 respiratory symptom (dry cough, productive cough, 
coryza, shortness of breath, or sneezing) within 2 weeks 
of onset of the conﬁ  rmed household primary case; and 
3) acute respiratory infection (ARI) cases were persons 
experiencing >1 respiratory symptom (as deﬁ  ned above) 
and/or fever within 2 weeks of onset of the conﬁ  rmed 
household primary case. A household contact was any 
person who lived in the same household as a conﬁ  rmed 
primary case-patient and >1 overnight stay after onset of 
illness in the person who was the primary case-patient (16).
A household was deﬁ  ned as the primary case-patient 
plus all household contacts. For a household, a virologically 
conﬁ  rmed primary case was the case-patient with ﬁ  rst date 
of onset within that household. A secondary case was any 
case-patient with date of onset >24 hours after date of onset 
of primary case. If a patient’s onset of illness was <24 hours 
of onset of the primary case, it was classiﬁ  ed as co-primary. 
A similar approach was followed for clinically conﬁ  rmed 
secondary cases, with clinical co-primary cases excluded.
Secondary cases were deﬁ  ned as case-patients who 
had received prophylaxis if AVs were administered <24 
hours before illness onset. Any asymptomatic contact 
who received AVs was classiﬁ  ed as having prophylaxis. 
For a small number of contacts with non–case-deﬁ  ning 
symptoms before starting AVs, it was not possible to 
distinguish prophylaxis and treatment. These contacts were 
excluded for AV analyses.
Case Ascertainment
Initially, all patients with virologically conﬁ  rmed 
cases detected in the United Kingdom were included in 
the FF100 dataset, and their households were followed up. 
As case numbers grew rapidly, convenience sampling was 
undertaken before closure of FF100 on June 21, 2009.
Collection of Epidemiologic Information
Information on case-patients was collected at 2 time 
points. Initial information was collected as soon as possible 
after a positive laboratory result was reported. Data were 
collected directly from case-patients or their parent or 
guardian by public health workers in person or by telephone 
interview. Information collected included demographics, 
clinical history (date of illness onset, signs and symptoms), 
medical history (including 2008–09 seasonal trivalent 
inﬂ   uenza vaccine or AV use), and underlying medical 
conditions. Inactivated trivalent inﬂ  uenza vaccines from 
various manufacturers are used in the United Kingdom with 
composition determined by World Health Organization 
recommendations.
Case-patients provided details of close household 
contacts. At initial interview, contacts were asked about 
their contact history with the primary case-patient; clinical 
history, including recent respiratory symptoms with 
dates of onset and treatment; medical history, including 
underlying medical conditions; and use of AVs with dates 
of administration.
Daily telephone follow-up of contacts was undertaken 
for 7 days. If any respiratory symptoms developed, contacts 
were instructed to speak to their general practitioners for 
prompt investigation, including collection of respiratory 
swab specimens. Swab samples were also inadvertently 
obtained from several contacts who did not have case-
deﬁ  ning illness. To ensure that all contacts testing positive 
for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus were identiﬁ  ed, the FF100 
database and Health Protection Agency (HPA) laboratory 
reports of conﬁ  rmed cases were compared.
Final follow-up of case-patients and household contacts 
was undertaken >2 weeks after to gather information on 
possible complications, ﬁ  nal outcome (e.g., illness, death, 
and recovery), and use of AVs and antimicrobial drugs. For 
scheduled telephone follow-up, calls were attempted for 
a minimum of 3 consecutive days before the patient was 
classiﬁ  ed as lost to follow-up. Information was gathered on 
a hard-copy questionnaire or entered directly into a Web-
enabled database. Data veriﬁ  cation and quality assurance 
were undertaken through standard data entry checks, 
double entry, and internal and external consistency checks.
Statistical Analysis
Single-person households were excluded from 
household analysis. SAR was calculated for clinical illness 
(ILI and ARI) and conﬁ  rmed infection. The cumulative 
household SAR was deﬁ   ned as the total number of 
secondary cases in a household divided by number of 
household members at risk (excluding primary and co-
primary cases) 14 days after onset in the primary case-
patient. Household SAR was calculated by age group (<16 
years, 16–49 years [reference group], >50 years), gender, 
AV prophylaxis (yes or no), and timing of treatment for 
the primary case-patient (<48 hours vs. >48 hours) through 
univariate logistic regression analyses for the different 
endpoints. Multivariate analyses were also performed, 
adjusted for the aforementioned variables, and model ﬁ  t 
assessed by using the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-ﬁ  t 
test. Because conﬁ  rmed SAR may be affected by failure 
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to obtain swabs from symptomatic contacts, observed 
positivity rates in the ARI and nonsymptomatic groups 
were used to adjust for this possibility.
A survival analysis was undertaken to determine the 
effect of prophylaxis on household SAR while accounting 
for timing of administration. A contact enters the model 
with time zero at index onset, and survival time is deﬁ  ned 
up until onset of disease in the contact (failure), or excluded 
at the end of the 2-week follow-up period. AV prophylaxis 
exposure was treated as a time-varying covariate, and 
for each contact, survival time was split into pre-AV and 
AV prophylaxis periods. The hazard ratio of becoming a 
secondary case-patient when AV prophylaxis was given 
was estimated by using Cox regression, adjusted for age, 
sex, and AV treatment of the primary case-patient <48 
hours. This approach accounted for prophylaxis not usually 
being given to contacts until the case-patient was identiﬁ  ed 
by health services.
Laboratory Conﬁ  rmation
Respiratory samples from inﬂ   uenza patients were 
analyzed for pandemic inﬂ   uenza A (H1N1) 2009 and 
seasonal inﬂ   uenza viruses by RT-PCR. Combined nose 
and throat swab specimens were collected from patients 
who had signs and symptoms of suspected infection. 
These specimens were sent to a designated UK laboratory 
performing real-time RT-PCR for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 diagnosis was conﬁ  rmed 
before June 2009 by sequencing the inﬂ   uenza A PCR 
amplicon (17), and from June onwards by real-time PCR of 
a swine lineage N1 (18).
Ethical Considerations
This observational study was undertaken as part 
of management of a national outbreak. The work was 
done under National Health Service Act 2006 (section 
251), which provides statutory support for disclosure of 
such data by NHS and data processing data by HPA for 
communicable disease control. Health Protection Scotland 
remains embedded as part of NHS, and outbreak and 
investigation data were shared as part of the coordination 
of national outbreaks.
Results
Recruitment and Follow-up of Households
A total of 322 conﬁ   rmed primary and co-primary 
case-patients were identiﬁ   ed in 296 households (Figure 
1). Of these 296 households, 37 were single-person. Case-
patients from single-person households were older (mean 
age 27.4 vs. 19.7 years in other households; p = 0.003) with 
a nonsigniﬁ  cant trend toward males (64.9% vs. 50.2%; p 
= 0.092). Single-person households were excluded from 
further analysis, leaving 259 primary and 26 co-primary 
case-patients in 259 households (Figure 1).
The total number of household contacts identiﬁ  ed was 
866. Of these, 105 (12.1%) declined to participate or were 
lost to follow-up (Figure 1), with no signiﬁ  cant differences 
in age (p = 0.32) and sex (p = 0.47) between those followed 
and not followed up. Distribution of household sizes, 
primary cases, contacts, and secondary cases is shown in 
Table 1.
Household and Primary Case-Patient Characteristics
Average household size was 4 people (SD = 2.1), with 
a median size of 4 (interquartile range [IQR] 3–5) (Table 
1). A comparison of age, gender, and AV use of primary 
case-patients, co-primary case-patients, and contacts is 
provided in Table 2.
Of the primary case-patients, 245 (95.7%) had received 
AV treatment (of whom 116/118 with information had 
received oseltamivir). Among treated case-patients, 104 
(42.4%) had started treatment <48 hours of disease onset, 
with median time to AV treatment of 3 days (IQR 1–5).
Household Close Contacts
The age and gender distribution of the 761 followed-up 
household contacts are summarized in Table 2. Information 
on AV prophylaxis was available for 587 contacts (Tables 
992  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 17, No. 6, June 2011
Figure 1. Flowchart of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 case-patients and 
household contacts, including contacts with respiratory symptoms, 
contacts from whom swab specimens were collected, and PCR 
result, United Kingdom, 2009. *Symptom onset date <2 weeks 
after index case-patient symptom onset; †46 persons had symptom 
onset date >2 weeks after index case-patient and 4 had missing 
symptom onset date; ‡5 persons had swabs taken >2 weeks after 
index case-patient symptom onset and 3 had positive test results; 
§2 persons (neither positive) had swabs taken >2 weeks after 
index case-patient symptom onset; ¶3 persons (none positive) had 
swabs taken >2 weeks after index case-patient symptom onset.Household Transmission of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, UK
2, 3); of the 444 contacts who named the AV they received, 
435 received oseltamivir. Mean number of days from 
onset in the primary case-patient to starting prophylaxis in 
contacts was 4.4 days (SD 4.9, median 4 days, IQR 2–6 
days) (Figure 2). Compliance for use of AVs found 255 
contacts with information on prophylaxis start and end 
dates, with a median time to receiving AV of 9 days (IQR 
8–10). Only 8 contacts received treatment for <5 days. 
Household Secondary Attack Rates
Household contacts in whom respiratory symptoms 
developed within 2 weeks and from whom swab samples 
were collected are summarized in Figure 1. Overall, of 761 
household contacts, 166 had ARI symptoms, 62 of whom 
were conﬁ  rmed secondary case-patients, with a SAR of 
8.1% (Table 4). Among those without ARI, 43 provided 
swab samples, 6 of whom had positive test results. The 
positivity rate in those with and without ARI that were 
tested was projected onto non-swabbed ARI patients to 
give an adjusted conﬁ   rmed SAR of 13.8%. The SAR, 
adjusted for age and sex, was 16.7%.
Univariate analysis revealed a signiﬁ  cantly  higher 
conﬁ  rmed SAR for patients aged <16 years and for those 
16–49 years, compared to those >50 years. The SAR in 
male patients was higher than female patients, but the 
difference was not signiﬁ  cant (Table 4). Most secondary 
case-patients (86.8%, 45/53) had not received prophylaxis; 
contacts who had not received AV prophylaxis had a 
signiﬁ  cantly higher conﬁ  rmed SAR than those who had 
(Table 4). Contacts who received prophylaxis <2 days after 
onset in the primary case-patient had a nonsigniﬁ  cantly 
higher SAR than those who received therapy later (Table 
3), although the study did not have sufﬁ  cient statistical 
power to detect such differences. The conﬁ  rmed SAR was 
signiﬁ  cantly lower in contacts whose primary case-patient 
had received treatment <48 hours of onset rather than after 
48 hours (Table 4).
The conﬁ  rmed SAR by age of primary case-patients is 
shown in Table 5. Conﬁ  rmed SAR was high among those 
<16 years of age, whether the primary case-patient was a 
child or an adult. Similarly, SAR was low among adults, 
whether the primary case-patient was a child or an adult 
(Table 5). When transmission from adults to children was 
analyzed by gender, a signiﬁ  cant difference was found for 
SARs in children according to sex of the adult primary 
case-patient: 33.3% (10/30, 95% conﬁ  dence interval [CI] 
17.3–52.8) for female primary case-patients and 2.9% 
(1/34, 95% CI 0.1–15.3) for men (odds ratio 16.5, 95% CI 
2.0–138.8; p = 0.010).
Multivariate analysis shows the adjusted odds for a 
virologically conﬁ  rmed secondary case were signiﬁ  cantly 
higher for children <16 years of age than for adults. In 
addition, contacts who received AV prophylaxis had a 
signiﬁ  cantly reduced risk of conﬁ  rmed infection than those 
not treated (Table 4). Finally, the adjusted odds of a secondary 
case-patient were signiﬁ  cantly lower when the primary case-
patient had received treatment <48 hours of onset.
SAR for Clinically Conﬁ  rmed Cases of ILI and ARI
For the ILI outcome, 259 households yielded an 
additional 16 cases deﬁ  ned as co-primaries. Seventy-eight 
clinically conﬁ   rmed secondary cases occurred among 
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Table 1. Household size of case-patients with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection, United Kingdom, 2009 
No. persons in household  No.  households 
No. primary and co-primary 
case patients  No. contacts  No. secondary case-patients 
24 2 4 4 4 0 2
34 6 5 1 8 7 6
4 76 81 223 15
5 28 31 109 7
61 8 2 0 8 8 2
71 2 1 7 6 7 1 3
8 7 10 46 5
94 4 3 2 1
10 4 5 35 6
11 2 2 20 2
15 1 1 14 3
Total 240 266 761 62
Table 2. Primary and co-primary confirmed case-patients with 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection and household contacts, 
by sex, age, and prophylaxis status, United Kingdom, 2009* 
Variable
No. (%) primary and co-
primary case-patients 
No. (%) 
contacts
Sex, n = 1,030 
  M  143 (50.2)  364 (48.9) 
  F  142 (49.8)  381 (51.1) 
Age, y 
  <16  154 (54.0)  212 (27.9%) 
  16–49  114 (40.0)  378 (49.7) 
 > 50 17 (6.0)  171 (22.5) 
Prophylaxis, n = 843  
  No  253 (98.8)  132 (22.5) 
  Yes  3 (1.2)  455 (77.5) 
Total 285 761
*n = 1,046 except as indicated. RESEARCH
745 contacts for an overall household ILI SAR of 10.5% 
(Table 6).
For the ARI outcome, a further 26 ARI cases were 
deﬁ  ned as co-primaries. In the 259 households, of 719 
contacts, 120 secondary case-patients resulted for an ARI 
SAR of 16.7% (Table 7). The effect of age, AV prophylaxis 
of contacts, and early treatment of case-patients were 
generally similar for both ILI and ARI clinical endpoints 
compared to virologically conﬁ   rmed endpoints in both 
univariate and adjusted analysis (Tables 6, 7).
Survival Analysis of Prophylaxis
The hazard ratio (HR) of becoming a conﬁ  rmed 
secondary case-patient when receiving AV drugs was 0.08 
(95% CI 0.02–0.27). Results were similar after adjusting 
for AV treatment of the primary case-patient, age, and 
sex (HR 0.09, 95% CI 0.03–0.32). When looking at ILI 
endpoint, the unadjusted HR was 0.27 (95% CI 0.13–0.56) 
and adjusted HR was 0.27 (95% CI 0.13–0.57) and for 
ARI, the unadjusted HR was 0.31 (95% CI 0.18–0.52) 
and adjusted was 0.27 (95% CI 0.15–0.48). The Kaplan-
Meier plots for the 3 endpoints are shown in Figure 3 and 
multivariate survival analysis results in Table 8.
In most households, either all members received 
prophylaxis (122/206, 59.2%) or none at all (30/206, 14.6%). 
In discordant households, where some received prophylaxis 
and some did not (54/206, 26.2%), virologically conﬁ  rmed 
SAR was similar to the main analysis: the SAR was 41.7% 
(95% CI 30.8%–53.4%) in those not receiving and 3.2% 
(95% CI 0.9%–7.9%) in those receiving prophylaxis. 
Survival analyses were repeated to allow for clustering 
within households, with the CIs being marginally wider.
Discussion
This study involved the prospective follow-up 
of households during the UK containment phase for 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009. We found a moderately high, 
virologically conﬁ  rmed SAR with higher clinical (ILI and 
ARI) endpoints. Age-speciﬁ  c differences for SARs were 
signiﬁ  cant; the SAR was highest among children. The SARs 
for child contacts were higher when adult women were the 
primary case-patients than when men were. Finally, most 
secondary case-patients had not received AV prophylaxis, 
and AV administration to household contacts substantially 
reduced the risk for infection.
This study found an overall virologically conﬁ  rmed 
household SAR of 8%, similar to results for an earlier 
study involving the FF100 (11): SAR reached 34% among 
contacts who did not receive AV prophylaxis. The SAR 
increased further for clinical endpoints. These SARs 
for those who did not receive AVs compare to results of 
a study in Kenya which reported a conﬁ  rmed household 
SAR of 26% (10) in a population without widespread use 
of AV prophylaxis. Another study in Japan (7), where 
>90% of contacts had received AV prophylaxis, reported 
a virologically conﬁ  rmed SAR of only 5%. Other studies 
have used clinical endpoints, such as in the United States 
(8), where a clinical SAR of 10% was reported after 7 days. 
These  ﬁ   ndings compare to household SARs found for 
seasonal inﬂ  uenza in historical studies, ranging from 18% 
(19) to 22% (20). Although these studies had similar design, 
there are several possible explanations for our results, 
such as differences in case deﬁ  nition, a different period of 
follow-up, differences in ascertainment of secondary cases, 
and differences in AV use. Our observed SAR among 
those who did not receive prophylaxis is higher than that 
previously observed for seasonal inﬂ  uenza and suggests 
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Table 3. Confirmed SAR of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection, according to time antiviral drug prophylaxis began after onset of
illness in primary case-patient, plus timing of secondary cases after onset of primary case, United Kingdom, 2009* 
Timing
No.
contacts
No. secondary case-
patients at 14 d  SAR, % (95% CI)
No. (%) secondary case-patients 
2 d  3–4 d  5–7 d  >7 d 
No prophylaxis  143 45 31.5 (24.0–39.8)  15 12 10 8
Day 0   57 1 1.8 (0.0–9.4)  0 0 1 0
Days 1–2 (<48 h)   81 4 4.9 (1.4–12.2)  0 3 1 0
Day 3–7 (inclusive)  214 3 1.4 (0.3–4.0)  NA 0 3 0
>7 d 92 0 0.0 (0.0-3.9)  NA NA NA 0
Total case-patients  587 53 9.0 (6.8–11.7)  15 (2.6)  15 (2.6)  15 (2.6)  8 (1.4) 
*SAR, secondary attack rate; CI, confidence interval; NA, not applicable. 
Figure 2. Days from symptom onset date of household primary 
case-patient with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection until 
antiviral prophylaxis started, N = 352, United Kingdom, 2009.Household Transmission of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, UK
a substantial proportion of close contacts were infected 
with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. Serologic studies will 
provide important insights into the rates of infection (both 
symptomatic and asymptomatic in a household setting).
Recent publications have explored the possibility of 
using household data to estimate AV effectiveness for 
seasonal inﬂ  uenza (21,22). Our study provides evidence 
that AV prophylaxis of household contacts signiﬁ  cantly 
reduces SAR for all endpoints, updating earlier work (11). 
Most secondary cases occurred in contacts who had not yet 
received AV prophylaxis after onset of illness in the primary 
case-patient, with a very high SAR observed in those that 
had not received AV for all endpoints, due to the delay for 
many before prophylaxis was started. The adjusted survival 
analysis took into account the confounding effect of time 
to prophylaxis and demonstrated that AVs are effective for 
all endpoints. Other studies in Japan (7), the United States 
(9,12), Hong Kong, China (23), and Germany (24) have 
attempted to determine the effectiveness of postexposure 
prophylaxis for pandemic inﬂ   uenza. Most show a 
statistically nonsigniﬁ   cant positive effect of AVs (7,9). 
Studies concerning AV effectiveness for seasonal inﬂ  uenza, 
in particular a large placebo-controlled household study, 
found that postexposure prophylaxis reduced the incidence 
of infection in close household contacts by 89% (25). Our 
study demonstrates that timely administration of AVs 
to close contacts provides signiﬁ   cant protection against 
clinical disease.
Our study found clear age-speciﬁ  c differences in SAR, 
with a much higher household SAR in children than in the 
elderly. This age-speciﬁ  c pattern is also replicated, at least 
partially, by seasonal inﬂ  uenza: Longini reported a SAR of 
24% in those <18 years of age and a rate of 14% in those 
>18 years (26). The high household SARs in children in the 
present study, illustrates the susceptibility of this subgroup 
and is consistent with general practice consultation data, 
laboratory surveillance data, and results of school outbreak 
investigations (27,28). The observation of very low SAR 
in those >50 years, who have also had household exposure 
to a conﬁ   rmed case, demonstrates protection afforded 
by cross reacting H1N1 inﬂ  uenza antibodies from prior 
exposure to H1N1 subtypes circulating in the period before 
1957 (29,30).
This study found that SAR was signiﬁ  cantly lower 
when the primary case-patient had received rapid AV 
treatment, before and after adjustment for prophylaxis 
of contacts. The observation is biologically plausible as 
studies demonstrate early AV use reduces virus shedding 
(31). This may translate into reduced likelihood of 
secondary transmission and supports rapid treatment of 
patients to reduce household transmission. The observation 
that SARs from child to child and from adult to child 
(>20%) were similar, yet at least 4-fold higher than from 
child to adult or adult to adult, is also consistent with the 
increasing prevalence of cross-reacting antibodies against 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus with age (32). Children are 
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Table 4. Univariate and multivariate analysis of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection SAR for virologically confirmed cases of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection, by gender, age group, and prophylaxis, United Kingdom, 2009* 
Variable
No.
contacts†
No. secondary 
case-patients
Univariate analysis  Multivariate analysis 
SAR, % (95% CI)  p value‡  OR (95% CI)  p value 
Sex, n = 745 
  M  364 37 10.2 (7.5–13.7)  1.0, baseline 
  F  381 25 6.6 (4.0–10.7)  0.08 1.0 (0.5–2.0)  0.96
Age, y 
  <16  212 40 18.9 (14.2–24.7)  18.2 (3.9–85.5) 
  16–49  378 20 5.3 (3.1–9.0)  3.5 (0.7–16.2) 
 > 50 171 2 1.2 (0.3–4.7)  <0.001  1.0, baseline  <0.001 
Prophylaxis, n = 587 
  No  143 45 31.5 (24.4–39.5)  1.0, baseline 
  Yes  444 8 1.8 (0.8–3.9)  <0.001  0.05 (0.02–0.09)  <0.001 
Primary case-patient treatment 
  >48 h  453 48 10.6 (8.1–13.8)  1.0, baseline 
 <48 h  308 14 4.5 (2.5–8.1)  0.003  0.30 (0.13–0.68)  0.004 
Total 761 62 8.1  (6.4–10.3) 
*n = 761 except as indicated. Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test for multivariate model, p = 0.751. SAR, secondary attack rate; CI, confidence 
interval; OR, odds ratio. 
†Excludes co-primary cases. 
‡Indicates overall p value for differences by group. 
Table 5. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection SAR, by age of 
patient with virologically confirmed primary case, United 
Kingdom, 2009*  
Transmission†
No.
contacts
No. secondary 
case-patients
SAR, %  
(95% CI) 
Child to child  148 29 19.6 (13.5–26.9) 
Child to adult  318 9 2.8 (1.3–5.3) 
Adult to adult  231 13 5.6 (3.0–9.4) 
Adult to child  64 11 17.2 (8.9–28.7) 
*SAR, secondary attack rate; CI, confidence interval. 
†Primary case-patient to contact.  RESEARCH
known to excrete inﬂ  uenza virus in higher titers and for a 
longer period than adults (33,34), and social play between 
children often entails very close contact, so an SAR of 21% 
from child-to-child is expected. The SAR, however, for 
adult-to-child transmission was just as high, particularly 
among female primary case-patients, which suggests that 
despite lower virus titers and shorter duration of excretion, 
women transmitted pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection as 
efﬁ   ciently as child primary case-patients. This suggests 
adult respiratory hygiene is suboptimal in the home 
environment.
This study has several strengths: this is one of the 
largest pandemic inﬂ   uenza household studies published 
to date, and active follow-up was undertaken with daily 
telephone calls to ensure timely clinical investigation with 
swab collection to maximize case ascertainment. There are, 
however, limitations. First, not all those who had respiratory 
symptoms develop had throat swabs done, leading to 
under-ascertainment of conﬁ  rmed secondary case-patients. 
Adjustments have been made to account for this. Second, 
case ﬁ  nding was based on a screening algorithm requiring 
fever. Thus, primary cases of pandemic inﬂ  uenza without 
fever would have been excluded; however, all clinical 
endpoints were gathered from secondary case-patients. 
Third, this article presents information only on clinical and 
virologic endpoints. There is now evidence that a substantial 
proportion of persons exposed to a primary case-patient will 
have asymptomatic or very mildly symptomatic infection. 
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Table 6. Univariate and multivariate analysis of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection SAR for clinically confirmed cases of influenza-
like illness, by gender, age group, and prophylaxis, United Kingdom, 2009* 
Variable
No.
contacts†
No. secondary 
case-patients
Univariate analysis  Multivariate analysis 
SAR % ( 95% CI)  p value‡  OR (95% CI)  p value 
Sex, n = 730 
  M  357 33 9.2 (6.7–12.7)  1.00, baseline 
  F  373 45 12.1 (7.9–18.1)  0.22 2.6 (1.4–4.9)  0.003 
Age group, y 
  <16  204 38 18.6  (13.9–24.6)  7.8 (2.7–22.1) 
 16–49  371 32 8.6 (5.4–13.5)  2.7 (1.0–7.4) 
 > 50 170 8 4.7  (2.2–9.8)  <0.001  1.00, baseline  <0.001 
Prophylaxis, n = 573 
  No  129 56 43.4 (35.1–52.1)  1.0, baseline 
  Yes  444 18 4.1 (2.3–7.1)  <0.001  0.05 (0.02–0.09)  <0.001 
Primary case-patient treatment 
  >48 h  445 55 12.4 (9.6–15.8)  1.0, baseline 
 <48 h  300 23 7.7 (4.7–12.2)  0.040  0.78 (0.42–1.48)  0.458 
Total  745 78 10.5  (8.5–12.9) 
*n = 745 except as indicated. Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test for multivariable model, p = 0.291. SAR, secondary attack rate; CI, confidence 
interval; OR, odds ratio. 
†Excludes co-primary case-patients. 
‡Indicates overall p value for differences by group. 
Table 7. Univariate and multivariate analysis of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 SAR infection for acute respiratory infection, by gender, age 
group and prophylaxis, United Kingdom, 2009* 
Variable
No.
contacts†
No. secondary 
case-patients
Univariate analysis  Multivariate analysis 
SAR, % (95% CI)  p value‡  OR (95% CI)  p value 
Sex, n = 704 
  M  339 56 16.5  (12.9–20.9)  1.0, baseline 
  F  365 64 17.5  (12.5–24)  0.72 1.9 (1.0–3.5)  0.04
Age, y 
  <16  194 49 25.3  (15.4–38.6)  7.0 (3.0–21.0) 
  16–49  359 56 15.6  (9.2–25.2)  3.6 (1.5–8.8) 
 > 50 166 15 9.0  (5.5–14.4)  <0.001  1.0, baseline  0.001 
Prophylaxis, n = 549 
  No  106 80 75.5  (66.4–82.7)  1, baseline 
  Yes  443 34 7.7  (4.5–12.7)  <0.001  0.02 (0.01–0.03)  <0.001 
Primary case-patient treatment  
  >48 h  435 79 18.2 (14.8–22.1)  1, baseline 
 <48 h  284 41 14.4 (10.1–20.3)  0.019  1.7 (0.9–3.1)  0.11
Total  719 120 16.7  (14.1–19.6) 
*n = 719 except as indicated. Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test for multivariate model, p = 0.392. SAR, secondary attack rate; CI, confidence 
interval; OR, odds ratio. 
†Excludes coprimary case-patients. 
‡Indicates overall p-value for differences by group. Household Transmission of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, UK
This requires serologic investigation (30). Fourth, because 
data were captured as part of the acute public health 
response, data gathering was undertaken through multiple 
interviewers. Missing data were minimized by ﬁ  nal follow-
up of case-patients and contacts, and the demographic 
proﬁ  le was not indicative of a systematic bias that might 
invalidate the results. Fifth, if a primary case-patient was 
conﬁ  rmed quickly, their contacts may have avoided further 
contact, whereas if the primary case-patient was identiﬁ  ed 
later, close contact may not have been avoided. However, 
a time-varying survival analysis found no signiﬁ  cant 
difference for contacts not receiving AV. Sixth, information 
concerning prior respiratory disease in contacts was not 
gathered, and some persons may have had prior exposure to 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009. However, this is unlikely because 
pandemic transmission was not yet widespread when 
our data were collected, and this should not have been a 
major potential confounding factor. Finally, we assumed 
household secondary case-patients acquired their infection 
after contact with a deﬁ  ned primary case-patient in the 
household, rather than in the community. Although more 
advanced statistical methods do exist to take into account 
these competing transmission risks (26,35), this study was 
undertaken at a stage when community transmission was 
limited so this contribution is assumed to be minimal.
In conclusion, we demonstrate transmission of 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza in the household setting in the United 
Kingdom during the containment phase. Household 
SARs were generally higher than those of seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza. Timely AV treatment of primary case-patients 
and prophylaxis was effective in protecting household 
contacts, although delayed administration of AV did allow 
spread. Prompt AV administration (either as treatment or 
prophylaxis) reduces symptomatic SARs.
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Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier graphs of days from symptom onset in index case-patient until onset of symptoms in secondary case-patients, 
United Kingdom, 2009.  A) Virologically conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009; B) clinical inﬂ  uenza-like illness; C) acute respiratory infection.
Table 8. Multivariable survival analysis of for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection SAR with virologic, influenza-like-illness, and acute 
respiratory infection endpoints, by gender, age group, and prophylaxis, United Kingdom, 2009* 
Variable
Hazard ratio (95% confidence interval) 
Virologic Influenza-like illness  Acute respiratory infection 
Sex
  M  1 (reference)  1 (reference)  1 (reference) 
  F  0.97 (0.56–1.69)  1.77 (1.08–2.89)  1.30 (0.90–1.90) 
Age, y
  <16  4.23 (2.35–7.62)  2.78 (1.68–4.61)  1.90 (1.29–2.81) 
  16–49  1 (reference)  1 (reference)  1 (reference) 
 > 50 0.33 (0.08–1.42)  0.47 (0.18–1.22)  0.54 (0.29–1.00) 
Antiviral drug prophylaxis 
  Untreated  1 (reference)  1 (reference)  1 (reference) 
  Treated  0.09 (0.03–0.32)  0.27 (0.13–0.57)  0.27 (0.15– 0.48) 
Index case-patient treatment 
  >48 h  1 (reference)  1 (reference)  1 (reference) 
 <48 h  0.45 (0.23–0.87)  0.72 (0.42–1.23)  0.99 (0.66–1.50) 
*SAR, secondary attack rate. RESEARCH
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